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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.
MARY JEAN JOHNSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20070280-CA

:

Appellant is incarcerated.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for Forgery, a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (2003); and Possession of a Forgery Device, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-502 (2003); and Falsely
Making, Encoding or Signing a Financial Transaction Card, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.1 (2003), in the Third Judicial District, in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod, presiding.
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j)
(2002). See Addendum A (Sentence, Judgment, and Commitment).1
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Point I. Where a presentence report recommends probation, does a trial court
abuse its discretion when it imposes consecutive sentences relying on improper factors

1

A copy of the Sentence, Judgment and Commitment from both of the cases is included
in Addendum A.

and failing to consider the mandated factors required by Utah law.
Standard of Review: This Court reviews sentences for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113,1120 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). "'An abuse of discretion
may be manifest if the actions of the judge in sentencing were "inherently unfair" or if the
judge imposed a "clearly excessive" sentence.'" State v. Elm, 808 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah
1991).
Preservation: This issue was preserved below. R. 116:3.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The text of the following relevant provision is provided in full in Addendum B.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is a consolidation of the two following cases: On October 28, 2005, in
case number 051907686 (686), Ms. Johnson was charged by Information with Falsely
Making, Encoding or Signing a Financial Transaction Card, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.1 (2003) and Theft by Deception, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (2003). (R. (686): 1-3). On July
21, 2006, in case number 061904772 (772), Ms. Johnson was charged by Information
with two counts of Forgery, third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6501 (2003); one count of Theft by Deception, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (2003), nine counts of Possession of a Forged Writing, a third
2

degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-502 (2003); and one count of
Attempted Theft by Deception, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-405. (R. (772): 1-6).
On November 27, 2006, Ms. Johnson entered a guilty plea to one count of Falsely
Making, Encoding or Signing a Financial Transaction Card, a third degree felony. (R.
(686): 100, 102-108). During the same hearing, Ms. Johnson also entered guilty pleas to
one count of Forgery, a third degree felony and Possession of a Forged Writing, a third
degree felony. (R. (772):69-70; 76-82). A presentence report was ordered and prepared
for sentencing purposes. R. 123.
On March 19, 2007, the trial court imposed three indeterminate terms of zero to
five years in the Utah State Prison, to be served consecutively. R. 116:5; see also (R.
(686): 124-25; (772):95-98).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 27, 2006, Ms. Johnson entered a guilty plea to one count of Falsely
Making, Encoding or Signing a Financial Transaction Card, a third degree felony. (R.
(686).T00, 102-108). During the same hearing, Ms. Johnson also entered guilty pleas in
case number 772 to one count of Forgery, a third degree felony and Possession of a
Forged Writing, a third degree felony. (R. (772):69-70; 76-82). A presentence report was
ordered and prepared for sentencing purposes. R. 123.
On March 19, 2007, a sentencing hearing was held for both cases. R. 116. During
3

the sentencing hearing, defense counsel argued that the trial court should follow the
presentence report's recommendation for probation and parole for Ms. Johnson. R.
116:3. The presentence report prepared by Adult Probation and Parole (AP & P)
recommended that Ms. Johnson serve 36 months of supervised probation with the
following special conditions:
(1) Serve 240 days in the Salt Lake County Jail; (2) Successfully complete a
substance abuse evaluation within 30 days of release from custody, and
comply with treatment as directed by AP&P; (3) Obtain a mental health
assessment within 30 days of release from custody, and comply with
treatment as directed by AP&P; (4) Take medication as prescribed, to be
monitored at the discretion of the AP&P; (5) Not use or possess illegal
drugs or alcohol, nor frequent places where alcohol is the chief item of sale;
(6) Pay a fine of $925.00 in each case, which includes the surcharge; (7)
Pay a court security fee of $50.00; (8) Have no contact with the
codefendant, unless otherwise approved by AP&P; (9) Enter and
successfully complete the Adult Basic Education program at the Day
Reporting Center and obtain a G.E.D. or high school diploma as directed by
AP&P. Upon proof of completion it may be recommended that [Ms.
Johnson] have $250 credited to her fine; (10) Pay restitution in the amount
of $161.16 in case # (686), and any other legitimate claims submitted in
these cases.
R. 123:1-2.
The presentence report investigator stated that "recommendations have been made
to address public safety issues, as well as Ms. Johnson's needs, and it was determined she
is an appropriate candidate for the privilege of supervised probation." R. 123:3. In
support of Ms. Johnson and in offering her a place to live, Ruth Evans wrote the
following letter:
My name is Ruth Evans, my husband is Roger Evans, we are living in
4

Mapleton, Utah. We have know[n] Mary Jean Johnson for five years. She
and my son John M. Bayson were living in our house for some time. Now,
I'm 68 years old and I'm sick. So, if she wants to come to our house, she's
very welcome and very greatfull [sic].
R. 123.
Defense counsel argued that Ms. Johnson's "life has been a pitiful rendition from
childhood on." Ms. Johnson has "been abused emotionally and physically . . . [and has]
never had . . . [a] place to live for long periods of time." R. 116:2. The trial court stated
that "[i]f we put her in prison for a long time it would give her a place to live." R. 116:2.
The trial court then stated that "[i]t's not just that she doesn't have a place to live. She
keeps committing the crimes." R. 116:2. Defense counsel argued that incarceration has
"not seemed to be of any positive import to Ms. Johnson" and noted that Ms. Johnson
"has been on mental health medication." R. 116:2. Defense counsel asked the court to
follow the recommendation of AP&P of probation and giving credit for time served. R.
116:3. The trial court then stated
[I]t troubles me [Ms. Johnson] says she wants to live with Ms. Evans down
in Mapleton, this is an elderly sick person. She has a pattern of taking
advantage of people whenever she has the opportunity, she steals their
credit cards and uses them or she forges things. So it's just a new victim
waiting for the next crime.
R. 116:3.
The prosecutor stated that he believed that Ms. Johnson deserved to go to prison
and would give Salt Lake County citizens a "reprieve^ from her criminal conduct." R.
116:3-4. Defense counsel argued that he did not "know if the penitentiary is a place for
5

someone with the mental problems and emotional problems that [Ms. Johnson's had]."
R. 116:4.
The trial court imposed Ms. Johnson's sentence of three indeterminate terms of
zero to five years in prison to be served consecutive to each other. R. 116:5.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court abused its discretion when it imposed consecutive sentences
without considering all of the statutory factors mandated when imposing a sentence for
more than one felony offense. The presentence report requested and prepared on Ms.
Johnson considered all of the statutory factors and recommended probation. Instead of
following the presentence report's recommendation or explaining why it was deviating
from that recommendation, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences citing only to
her criminal history and stating that if the court puts Ms. Johnson "in prison for a long
time it would give her a place to live." The trial court's failure to consider the mandatory
factors before imposing consecutive sentences and reliance on an improper factor in
support of its drastic deviation from the presentence report was an abuse of discretion.
ARGUMENT
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY RELYING
ON AN IMPROPER FACTOR TO DRASTICALLY DEVIATE FROM THE
PRESENTENCE REPORT'S RECOMMENDATION OF PROBATION
AND IMPOSE CONSECUTIVE PRISON TERMS.
A trial court's "[a]buse of discretion 'may be manifest if the actions of the judge
in sentencing were "inherently unfair" or if the judge imposed a "clearly excessive
6

sentence.'"5' State v. Schweitzer, 943 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah 1997). A trial court abuses its
discretion when it "'fails to consider all legally relevant [sentencing] factors,'" State v.
McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) (quoting State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133,
1135 (Utah 1989) (footnote omitted)), or when the trial judge fails to give "'adequate
weight to certain mitigating circumstances."5 State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, ^[15, 40 P.3d
626 (quoting State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998)). This Court will find a trial
court has abused its discretion when it concludes that "no reasonable [person] would take
the view adopted by the trial court.55 Schweitzer, 943 P.2d at 651 (quotation omitted).
Trial courts are required to consider statutory factors and address
recommendations in the presentence report before imposing a sentence for more than one
felony offense. See State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211, T|48, 52 P.3d 451. Utah Code Ann.
§76-3-401 (2003), outlines the legally relevant sentencing factors a trial court is
mandated to consider before determining whether sentences will be imposes concurrently
or consecutively. Utah's appellate courts have noted that "[concurrent sentences are
favored over consecutive ones." Perez, 2002 UT App 211 at ^43. (citations omitted).
Section 76-3-401 states in part the following:
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of
more than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive
sentences for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall
indicate in the order of judgment and commitment:
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively
to each other; . . .
7

(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the
offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and
rehabilitative needs of the defendant.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) - (2).
A presentence report which contains detailed information regarding these statutory
factors can assist a trial court in exercising its discretion properly. See Helms, 2002 UT
12 at *f 13. This is because a "presentence report contains detailed information regarding
not only the 'gravity and circumstances of the offenses,' but also the 'history, character,
and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.'" Id. In Helms, the supreme court determined
that although a trial court's sentencing order may not "state to what extent it considered
each of the statutory factors at the sentencing hearing" a trial court's review of the
presentence report evidences that a trial court considered the relevant statutory factors
necessary. Id.
This Court has stated that when a trial court deviates from the recommendations of
AP&P without explanation and imposes consecutive sentences without record evidence to
indicate that all of the statutory factors had been considered, an abuse of discretion
occurs. Perez, 2002 UT App 211 at ^|48. Furthermore, an abuse of discretion will be
found if the defendant can "clearly show[] that the trial judge would have granted
probation except for some wholly irrelevant, improper[,| or inconsequential
consideration." State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P.2d 388, 393 (1957).
In Perez, the defendant had been convicted of aggravated burglary, a first degree
8

felony and attempted murder, a second degree felony. Id. at •pO. On appeal, Perez
argued, inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive prison
terms without considering all of the required statutory factors. Id. at ^[42. The
presentence report prepared for Perez had recommended that he serve concurrent prison
terms and the prosecutor had agreed with that recommendation. Id. at ^|44. In imposing
sentencing, the trial court noted that it had heard the evidence and found that Perez's
conduct in committing these offenses was "egregious." Id. at 45. After briefly touching
on the "gravity and circumstances of the offense" the trial court sentenced Perez to serve
his terms of imprisonment consecutively. Id This Court determined that "[t]he trial
court's brief commentary dealt only with the 'gravity and circumstances of the offenses,'
and did not explicitly address the presentence report's recommendation of concurrent
sentences." IcL at ^48. Nothing in the record indicated that the trial court '"considered]
the . . . history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining
whether to impose consecutive sentences.'" Id. (citation omitted).
As seen in Perez, trial courts often focus their sentencing decisions based on their
consideration of the "gravity and circumstances of the offense" alone and often fail to
adequately evaluate the other statutory factors. Often an abuse of discretion can be found
because of a trial court's failure to consider the rehabilitative needs of a defendant. For
example, in State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995) (Smith II), the defendant was
convicted of aggravated kidnapping, rape of a child, and two counts of sodomy on child.
9

Id at 238. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences because the crimes were
heinous, the defendant was a pedophile, and although the defendant's own victimization
as a child was a mitigating factor, he was responsible to get help for himself. Id, at 244.
Our supreme court held the sentence was an abuse of discretion because the trial court
ignored the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. Id. at 244-45.
An additional and highly important factor in deciding whether to impose
consecutive or concurrent sentences is that the Legislature, in enacting
indeterminate sentencing laws, has opted to give the Board of Pardons wide
latitude in deciding what a maximum sentence ought to be. State v. Strunk,
846 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Utah 1993). The Board is in a far better position than
a court to monitor a defendant's subsequent behavior and possible progress
toward rehabilitation while in prison and to adjust the maximum sentence
accordingly. While the trial court imposed the greatest minimum
mandatory sentences possible under the law, and justifiably so, we think it
unreasonable and an abuse of discretion to have imposed essentially a
minimum mandatory life sentence and thereby deprive the Board of Pardons
of discretion to take into account defendant's future conduct and possible
progress toward rehabilitation.
Id at 244-45 (citation omitted).
Similarly, in Galli, the defendant was convicted of three counts of aggravated
robbery, absconded, and lived in Minnesota for three years before being sentenced. See
Galli, 967 P.2d at 932. Our supreme court held the trial court abused its discretion by
ordering consecutive sentences because: (1) although the defendant's crimes were
serious, the record showed the trial court may not have "given adequate weight to certain
mitigating circumstances," including the fact that the defendant "did not inflict any
physical injuries," only used a "pellet gun," and took a "relatively small" amount of
10

money; (2) the defendant's history consisted only of "minor traffic offenses and one
misdemeanor theft conviction," and his act of absconding only provided "nominal
support" since he was not charged with bail jumping; (3) although the defendant's
"offenses and flight from justice reflected] negatively on his character," he "voluntarily
confessed and admitted responsibility," "expressed a commitment and hope to improve
himself," and, while in Minnesota, "obeyed the law, helped his neighbors, and was a
productive individual"; and (4) concurrent sentencing "better serve[ed]" his
"rehabilitative needs by allowing the Board of Pardons and Parole to release him from
prison after five years if he has shown genuine progress toward rehabilitation." Id. at
938; see Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1301-02 (holding trial court abused discretion by sentencing
16-year-old convicted of murder, child kidnapping, aggravated sexual abuse of a child to
consecutive sentences even though diagnostic report recommended "long period of
imprisonment" because trial court's sentence assured defendant "would spend a minimum
of twenty-four years in prison," failed to "sufficiently consider defendant's rehabilitative
needs in light of his extreme youth and the absence of prior violent crimes," and
"rob[bed] the Board of Pardons of any flexibility to parole [defendant] sooner").
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by drastically deviating from the
presentence reports recommendations of probation. Instead, the trial court imposed
consecutive sentences by relying on improper factors to support its deviation and failing
to consider the required statutory factors. See Sibert, 310 P.2d at 393 (trial court fails to
11

properly exercise its discretion when it is clear that probation was denied because of
"some wholly irrelevant, improper or inconsequential consideration"). The presentence
report investigator noted that "[i]n staffing this case, recommendations have been made to
address public safety issues, as well as Ms. Johnson's needs, and it was determined she is
an appropriate candidate for the privilege of supervised probation." R. 123:3. The
presentence report detailed the "gravity and circumstances" of Ms. Johnson's offenses,
her history, character and rehabilitative needs. Id.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court expressed concern over Ms. Johnson's
"accelerating [criminal] record." R. 116:2. Defense counsel explained that her criminal
record was indicative of Ms. Johnson's history of suffering emotional and physical abuse
as well as being homeless for long periods of time. R. 116:2. Because of Ms. Johnson's
history, defense counsel argued that incarceration has not shown to be "a curative for her
ills" or to have "any positive import" on her. R. 116:2. The trial court then stated that
"[i]f we put her in prison for a long time it would give her a place to live." R. 116:2. The
trial court then added "[i]t's not just she doesn't have a place to live. She keeps
committing the crimes." R. 116:2. The trial court also expressed concern regarding the
family Ms. Johnson was planning on residing with upon her release, stating:
It's just, it troubles me she says she wants to live with Ms. Evans down in
Mapleton, this is an elderly sick person. She has a pattern of taking
advantage of people whenever she has the opportunity, she steals their
credit cards and uses them or she forges things. So it's just a new victim
waiting for the next crime.
12
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My name is Ruth Evans, my husband is Roger Evans, we are living in
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Mr. Evans said he's not real excited about her living with him and his wife,
but realizes she has no where else to go, so they would allow her to stay
' "h them temporarily (two or three weeks), while she finds employment
a place of her ov m,
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R. 123:11.
The circumstances surrounding the offenses Ms. Johnson was convicted of do not
evidence victims who are particularly vulnerable due to age or health as the trial court's
comment would allude.2 In fact, the letter from Ms. Evans indicates that she has known
Ms. Johnson for a long period of time and trusts her to come and live with her. R. 123.
In addition, Ms. Evans does not live alone but with her husband who although not excited
to have Ms. Johnson come and reside with them, was willing to offer her a temporary
place to live and did not indicate that he was concerned that she would take advantage of
them. R. 123:11.
The trial court's reliance on improper factors in making its consecutive sentence
decision is evidenced not only by its unsupported concerns about Ms. Johnson's potential
residence but also by its statement that sending Ms. Johnson to prison for a long period of
time would solve the problem of giving her a place to live. See Sibert, 310 P.2d at 393.
Furthermore, while the trial court did cite to Ms. Johnson's "accelerating" criminal
history, it completely failed to explain why it was not only deviating from the
recommendations of AP&P but deviating dramatically from probation to imposition of

2

The factual basis given during the entry of her guilty pleas was that she "cashed a check
from Sonic Corporation which was unauthorized; and she was later discovered with other
forged checks some from Wells Fargo Bank with the name of Jon Bayon on them. She
was also in a vehicle with other Sonic Corporation checks containing her name on them."
R. 116:5. In addition, "Ms. Johnson used a credit card of Paul Sagers [which was left in
his pants when he dropped off his dry cleaning at a place Ms. Johnson worked] to make a
purchase at Lowe's without his permission." R. 116:5; see also R. (686:9).
14
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whether to impose consecutive sentences.'" Id. This is especially important in light of the
presentence report's explicit statement that it had come to its recommendation of
probation after reviewing LM,. ^' \ci\ u... M S. Tl ins, the trial court's abuse of discretion in
considering improper factors and failing to consider the ;•'* \**.^vy f;r^.v< v h.-- "n-- M.-,;n$_.
consecutive sentences in this case resulted in a sentence that was clearly unfair and
excessive given ihe circumstances.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse because the trial court abused its discretion by imposing
three consecutive terms of zero to five years.
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Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s) : SCOTT A WILSON
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: March 7
Audio
Tape Number:
64
Tape Count: 104 83 0
CHARGES
1. FORGERY
Plea:
5. POSSESS
Plea:

- 3rd Degree Felony
Guilty - Disposition: 11/ 27/2 006 Guilty
FORGERY WRITING/DEVICE - 3rd Degree Felony
Guilty
Disposition: 11/27/2006 Guilty

SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of FORGERY a 3rd Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESS FORGERY
WRITING/DEVICE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to
an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
To the SALT LAKE County snentr : The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation tn U I P Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
Page 1

Case No: 061904772
Date:
Mar 19, 2007

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The prison term is consecutive to case 051907686 and with each
count.

SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$2500.00
$0.00
$2150.00
$4650.00

Charge # 2
Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$2500.00
$0
$2150.00
$4650.00
Plus Interest

SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Attorney Fees:
Amount: $350.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: SALT LAKE COUNTY LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
The amount of Attorney Fees is to be determined by Board of
Pardons.
Dated this &A

day of

(_ L\fLL(M^_

, 20&T

STEPHEN L HENRIOD
<^V /
Dj^trict Court Judge
///fy\,
STAMP USED AT DIRECTION dF'JUDC!
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GRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintii f f ,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT
1

u ' • H" ' . "'I* I ->" ,'68 6 E S

Judge:
Datei

MARY JEAN JOHNSON,
Defendant

STEPHEN L HENRIOD
March 19, 2 0 0 7

PRESENT
Clerk:
lynm
Prosecutor: HALL, JEFFRE ¥ W
Defendant
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: March 7, 10 7 0
Audio
Tape Number:
64
Tape Count: 104835
CHARGES
]

FALSELY MAKE/CODE/SIGN FINANCIAL TRANS "2
Plea: Guilty

3rd Degree Felony

Disposition: 11/2 7/2 006 Guilty

SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's coi ivictioi i of FALSELY MAKE/CODE/SIGN
FINANCIAL TRANS C a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced
to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah
State Prison.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
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Case No: 051907686
Date:
Mar 19, 2007

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
This prison term is consecutive to case 061904772

SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

Total Fine
Total Suspended
Total Surcharge
Total Principal Due

$2500.00
$0.00
$2150.00
$4650.00
$2500.00
$0
$2150.00
$4650.00
Plus Interest

Pay fine to The Court.
Dated this

day of

STEMENtf-'HENM-qPi.lf.%
District tebvF-1*' " ^ ^ ^
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76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limitations — Definition.
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses.
The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of judgment and
commitment:
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrents • >: ^ n^vrt ; \. ; : .». !<
and
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any
other sentences the defendant is already serving.
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the
court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims,
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later
offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, unless the court
finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate.
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences are
to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall request
clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter a clarified
order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run conseciitively or
concurrently.
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single
criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1 -401
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all
sentences imposed m«v nn< <>\*rced 30 venrs imprisonment, except as provided under
Subsection (6)(b).
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if:
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a
maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs
after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed.
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant:
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were
committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing
court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to
the present offense did not occur after his initial sentencing by any other court.
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of
Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a single
term that consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows:

(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum
sentence is considered to be 30 years; and
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any,
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms.
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the
other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the longer
remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served.
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so
imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served under the commitments.
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose
consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a secure
correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated
or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the person is located.

Amended by Chapter 129, 2002 General Session

